ignore evidence that points to ties between government officials, civic leaders and drug dealers that form the basis of the 'parallel polities' that have emerged in the favelas and that stem from practices of clientelism that historically dominate Rio politics.3 A systematic comparative examination of favela-level political interactions suggests that traffickers have not only qualitatively transformed clientelist relations in favelas but have also developed complex and flexible networks to enable them and their allies to engage in other political activities. Through connections to state officials and civic leaders, criminals appropriate state power and social capital that make their ongoing criminal activities possible. Building on critical analyses of the democratisation process in Latin America this article explains the ways criminal organisations are integrated into local-level politics and the implications that has for the wider political system.
VIolent democracy in Latin America
The endemic social conflict, persistent human rights violations and inequality that characterise Latin American polities a generation after the return of democratic rule pose a major challenge to academics studying the politics of the region. While some have ascribed these disappointments to the failure of political institutions to eliminate the vestiges of authoritarianism and transform retrograde sectors of state and society, others have suggested that violence persists in Latin America not because of state weakness but, rather, because of the existence of external social forces and organisations that not only resist efforts to extend the rule of law but also engage with state actors to promote illegal activities and rights violations.
Guillermo O'Donnell argues that endemic human rights abuse in the hemisphere stems from the failure of public institutions and has resulted in the emergence of 'brown areas' where the state has a 'very low or nil' presence and power rests in private hands reproducing often discriminatory authoritarian practices. These 'brown areas' emerged as a result of the debt crisis and the historic inability of the Latin American state to penetrate certain segments of society and the national territory. They contrast with 'green' and 'blue' areas where the rule of law, respectively, partially or fully promote ongoing violence. Diane Davis and Anthony Pereira argue that to understand social conflict in a post-Cold War environment where interstate tensions appear less relevant to questions of security than terrorism and intrastate hostilities we need to understand not just the operation and failure of formal institutions but the nature and form of irregular armed forces and how their connections to other state and social actors contribute to those conflicts.9 For example, we can only understand Colombia's civil war through linkages which criminals, paramilitaries and guerrilla groups maintain to each other and to 'legitimate' sectors of state and society.10 On a different tack, Teresa Caldeira argues that violence in Brazil is characterised not just by authoritarian legacies in the police but also by the ways that the wealthy have privatised urban space based on a principle of private security. These arrangements create positive factors which lead to new violent actors in the guise of private security guards and persistent support among the upper classes for a police force which directs high levels of repression against the poor.n Leigh Payne has argued that 'uncivil movements', violent exclusionary social mobilisations, can use connections with state institutions to undermine the process of democratisation and strengthen the political hand of pro-authoritarian politicians.12 Finally, Martha Huggins has suggested that the growing activity of death squads and other forms of privatised violence in Brazil have led to changing practices of localised sovereignty which have undermined basic democratic guarantees for much of the population."l These approaches go beyond earlier efforts to understand violence by examining the networks of state and social actors, institutions, and interests that actively support rights abuse and conflict. Studying the particular structure of interactions criminals have with other actors in state and society will contribute to a deeper understanding of the formal and informal factors that prevent the full protection of basic rights, and of the ongoing conflicts The Dynamics of Criminal Governance 297 affecting the region, and will help clarify the challenges facing favelas in Rio and, more generally, Latin American democracies today.
Violence and politics in Rio dejaneiro
Drug trafficking emerged as a powerful force in Rio in the mid-198os, as the country underwent a transition to democracy, when Andean cocaine started to flow into Rio as part of an expansion of trafficking routes to Europe and North America. The density of favelas and corrupt policing that characterised these areas made them ideal places for the storage of cocaine in preparation for transhipment. Over time a local retail market developed and the poor drug dealers who controlled favela level operations became the public faces of a narcotics trade dominated by more powerful elements of Brazilian state and society.
While the popular press and some academics argue that Rio has become a 'divided city' where drug traffickers based in favelas stand outside ordered democratic political life, others see the problems affecting Rio in the context of an evolution of clientelist networks in which traffickers have inserted themselves into traditional patron-client relationships.14 This approach has provided important insights and a starting point from which we can look at the complex ways that criminal organisations, linked to the international black market, have affected governance in Rio.
The neo-clientelist approach stems out of work done from the 1970s onward that examines the interconnections between favelas and the city's political life.15 Elizabeth Leeds argues 'that the physical and criminal violence resulting from the drug trade is a visible and tangible form of violence used by the state and it masks a structural-institutional and more hidden violence while perpetuating neo-clientelistic political relationships'.16 Traffickers and the poor survive through a form of clientelism that operates in the spaces 14 
Internal Relations in Santa Ana
Gang members provide services to residents to maintain their support in the face of the violence provoked by drug trafficking.43 These efforts include providing funds to individuals in need, maintaining some degree of order by preventing assault and theft, and supporting large-scale festivities for residents.44
In early 1997, saying he was concerned about the violence affecting the favela, Arturo, the trafficker who controlled the complex of favelas Santa Ana sits in, asked Camilla, the head of the creche, to help organise an event The collaborative efforts that made the festa julina possible reflect how traffickers depend on civic actors to accomplish their objectives. While criminals have resources, their complicated legal and social position obliges them to work through other groups. For example, they depended on Camilla for the support that she could get from other favela residents. By working with a respected leader traffickers could reach out to critical local constituencies, such as parents and the elderly, they normally had little contact with, but who nevertheless suffered from the violence their activities generated. Traffickers also depended in a very concrete way on Josias who helped convince residents to move cars and who filed papers with police precincts to ensure some degree of safety during the party.
Despite his connection with Doca residents respect Josias. Camilla noted that it was good that Josias was president because without him she argued 45 
Relations between Santa Ana and outsiders
The 
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As in Santa Ana, traffickers in Tubardo also throw parties and offer gifts to residents.66 Traffickers host regular bailefunks and maintain a group of DJs on their payroll to run these events.67 For larger festivities they enlist the help of the Residents' Association in hiring performers, purchasing presents for attendees, and running the party. Bernardo frequently asked local businesses for funding to supplement traffickers' contributions.68
Again, network connections prove fundamental to traffickers' activities. The Residents' Association serves as a legitimate intermediary between the traffickers and the businesses, government agencies, and NGOs who subsidise their efforts to provide services to residents. This enables traffickers to save money and throw a better party while also building their own position in the community through indirect contacts to legal merchants and state officials. The AM leadership also uses their skills to mediate complex and difficult relations with residents and insulate traffickers from situations that may require them to use violence. As a result, traffickers try to avoid conflicts that could alienate them from the population.
Relations between Tubardo and outsiders
As in Santa Ana, the Tubarao Residents' Association also manages relations with state actors. When roads in the community or street lights need repair, the Association makes contact with the responsible agents. When state programmes call for local management, Association leaders choose who will get jobs and oversee the projects.
During the i998 elections Bernardo made deals to provide campaign workers for several candidates and negotiated direct monopoly access to the favela for one candidate. In discussions with his campaign manager, Bernardo asked the candidate to improve a stairway and an open plaza the traffickers used for parties. In addition, he said that the candidate would have to provide three clean cell phones for him, the imprisoned drug trafficker, and the trafficker's girlfriend.69 Bernardo clearly wanted to indicate to the campaign manager that he had an association with the trafficker and that he could guarantee him access to the community. The politician accepted the requests and employed a number of residents closely associated with Bernardo and the traffickers to campaign for him. The traffickers however On election day Bernardo's anger grew when he realised that one local neoPentecostal congregation was backing a third candidate. In the end, none of the politicians won but their contributions helped the Residents' Association to improve the stairway and plaza and gave the traffickers access to an improved plaza to sustain their efforts to gain the support of residents. Bernardo's connection with traffickers gave him leverage with the first politician even though the traffickers had no connection to the negotiations. The politician wanted to work with the Residents' Association because he thought the Association acted on behalf of the traffickers and could effectively guarantee his access. Nevertheless, this story also shows that the politician had little intention of directly seeking out the traffickers. The candidate worked through the Association because dealing with it did not entail the same types of risks as dealing with drug traffickers. In the end, the traffickers provided no such guarantee and made a deal with another candidate. The failure of the traffickers and the Association to promote one candidate created confusion in the favela and opened a space for the neo-Pentecostals to support a different candidate.
In Tubarao, the traffickers negotiate their relationships with the police directly but appeared to maintain different relationships with different shifts of police officers. Sitting near the top of the hill one day, Elizete, a part time drug dealer and mother, noted that: This suggests that individual police details were free to make their own arrangements. The public and ongoing trafficking that occurred in the community depended on the acquiescence of many police shifts. 70 Statements by Bernardo, 7 Oct. 1998. 71 Ibid.
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This situation changed, however, when a police officer involved with traffickers murdered five local residents, starting a riot in the wealthy neighbourhood below. The government, working with a Rio NGO, responded with an innovative community policing plan that succeeded in dramatically cutting violence for a period of two to three years.7" Bernardo had tried to head off the plan but the government by-passed him and set up the programme through the Ceuzinho Residents' Association. When the traffickers later threatened to murder the Ceuzinho Association's President, Bernardo convinced them to allow him to leave unharmed. Once the police programme began, the NGO organised a community leadership council to advise police. Bernardo took part in this group and unsuccessfully tried to end the programme. He failed because of broad support emanating from Ceuzinho leaders and arguments made by the police commander that if his police left, the government would send in a more violent unit.73 Bernardo had more success in other efforts to undermine the programme by making sure that his allies led projects directed at adolescents who might join the drug gang. He was also appointed to the board of a UNICEF programme associated with the reform and ensured his allies received jobs there also. In the end, while Bernardo could not stop the police reform by working with state and civic officials he did slow its expansion and provide some cover for the traffickers while also providing jobs to his constituents. The police commander reported that he knew of Bernardo's connection to traffickers and would use him to communicate with traffickers at critical moments to avoid violence in the favela.74
As in Santa Ana, the Residents' Association leader in Tubario acts as a legitimate front for the traffickers in negotiating with police and NGO activists. Traffickers had neither the political skills to engage in these negotiations nor the legal position even to sit down and talk with police and activists. Without the Residents' Association they would have had no one to defend their interests or to place their allies in positions within the reform programme.
While these structures show clear similarities to Santa Ana, they also suggest some differences. Since Bernardo was not a blood relation of the head trafficker the connection between traffickers, the Residents' Association, and residents played out differently in Tubario than it did in Santa Ana. The Association, for example, did not work as closely with the trafficklers in planning the election campaign and the result was that none of the three candidates supported by factions in the community won election. 
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Bernardo also had, perhaps, more stature in Tubarao than Josias did in Santa Ana. By the late i990os he had been in office for over I5 years and had directly participated in helping the Comando Vermelho gain control of the community. As a result he commanded great respect among residents and traffickers. Bernardo, unlike Josias, would directly ask residents to do certain things, such as not go to the traffickers after they had been robbed. He would also conduct his own investigations and pronounce judgements that residents and traffickers generally respected. Unlike Josias, who maintained familiar and joking relationships with residents, Bernardo maintained more formal relations. Finally, residents and outsiders frequently called on Bernardo to engage in difficult interventions with traffickers, such as when he prevented the murder of Ceuzinho's president or when he helped smooth over potential conflicts between police and traffickers.
VTigirio Geral
Vigairio is a community of about io,ooo located on the outskirts of Rio that suffered extremely high levels of violence in the early 1990os as a result of a conflict with traffickers from the neighbouring community of Despite the dramatic decrease in violence, many residents complained that some conditions had worsened as the traffickers weakened. For instance, with the entrance of the MSF, medical care had improved dramatically, but residents said that without the traffickers they had little money to buy the pharmaceuticals the traffickers used to pay for. On other occasions, residents complained that without traffickers, theft had increased. This was especially apparent during a flood when residents from the poorest section of the favela refused to evacuate for fear of thieves. One resident said 'most people aren't going to leave because they are afraid of getting robbed. There didn't Events during the 1998 elections made the weakness of trafficker network apparent. With the Residents' Association seemingly uninterested in working with candidates R6tbia, the owner of a local restaurant, took it upon herself to broker a deal with a candidate for state assembly. He agreed to hire a few residents to campaign for him and to fund improvements to the quadra in Vigario that had originally been built by the traffickers. Unfortunately his campaign poster carried the name of the gubernatorial candidate from his party. The traffickers, however, supported the gubernatorial candidate from another party and asked Almira to take the posters down. She refused. At that point a more powerful trafficker arrived from another favela, had local traffickers kidnap Ribia's boyfriend, and held him at gunpoint. Eventually, R6bia compromised and agreed to remove the name of the gubernatorial candidate from the posters.94
Without a connection to the Residents' Association, the local traffickers did not possess the political skills to go out and establish direct ties to a politician who would deliver services to the community. One could imagine that the Association, which had solid political connections, chose not to bring in a candidate specifically to avoid conflicts with traffickers. To make matters worse, without an ally in the Association, the traffickers lost control of the local election process. This created difficulties since the larger gang that the traffickers were affiliated with had chosen to support a specific gubernatorial candidate. Without having a direct hand in determining the terms of the agreement between the restaurant owner and the candidate, the traffickers had little control over what posters the candidate could put up.95 Finally, without an alliance with the Association, the traffickers had no skilled political mediator to help them deal with the issue of the posters. As a result, the traffickers had to resort to violence to achieve an acceptable outcome. While they had the name of the candidate removed from the posters, the traffickers alienated several residents and, despite their limited monopoly of violence, did not even achieve their initial objective of removing all of the posters. Even after the weakening of the Vigirio network, drug traffickers played a role in NGO operations. One Casa da Paz leader pointed out that when they invited guests to the community they always informed the traffickers.96 This not only kept traffickers aware of who was coming but also let them know the Casa da Paz's leadership was concerned that they knew who was in the community.
The eventual collapse of the Casa da Paz also illustrates the ongoing political role of traffickers. When Caio Ferraz, the original President of the Casa, left Brazil as a result of death threats from police, day-to-day leadership passed into the hands of an Executive Director, who maintained excellent community relations but who did not manage money well. Eventually he was replaced with a new Executive Director did a good job managing the Casa's finances but did not maintain strong ties to residents. To make matters worse, the new Director had previously worked in favelas whose traffickers had poor relations with those in Vigirio.97 Eventually these factors brought together a coalition of residents and NGO workers partially backed by the traffickers that forced Ferraz and the Casa Director to resign.98
Even in the difficult circumstances they faced, traffickers used links with other groups in the community to accomplish their goals. Traffickers could not have unilaterally threatened the CdP leadership since this would weaken their position and increase local resentment. Traffickers could only achieve their aims by linking to other social organisations who could make their voice publicly heard and who had the political skills to negotiate with residents and outsiders.
Analysing favela politics
To understand Rio politics today one must understand the ways that criminals, civic leaders and state officials build connections to each other. Networks help to bring together functionally differentiated actors who have diverse skills and experiences that can contribute to ongoing criminal activity. As Vigirio demonstrates, when networks break down criminals do not possess the necessary skills to manage local political operations. Further, as is demonstrated by the involvement of lawyers and community residents, network connections help traffickers build trust for activities they engage in. As we saw with the very different relations that politicians and traffickers had with favela residents, networks enable groups to build up different types of linkages between actors. Finally, as the efforts on the part of Residents' 96 Clarinha, CdP activist and massacre survivor, 3o Jan. 1998. 97 Obsered conversation among residents and NGO workers in street, z22 Jan. 1998. 98 Observed meeting of commission seeking to replace CdP leadership, 30 Jan. 1998. 32 zo Enrique DesmondArias because he thought that the trafficker had guaranteed his access. In the end, of course, this was not the case. The traffickers made a deal with another politician and the Neo-Pentecostal group supported a third. This shows that when traffickers do not work closely with local leaders it is difficult for them to guarantee anyone monopoly access to the community. Only through collusion between traffickers and civic leaders can community groups make effective arrangements to guarantee politicians access to a favela. Again, Vigairio provides a counter-point. Traffickers had an arrangement with a particular politician and a resident set up relations with a second politician. Without effective mediation through the Residents' Association, traffickers had to use threats of violence to uphold their agreement with the first politician.
Traffickers use networks to build legitimacy in the communities in which they operate. Other works have shown that traffickers make significant efforts to build support among the population they live and work with.99 By working through respected local leaders traffickers benefit from their reputation and prestige in the community and, as was the case with the festajulina in Santa Ana, use those contacts to promote events that will generate more good will towards them. In exchange, social leaders gain resources and some flexibility in dealing with the traffickers. In the case of Santa Ana, the Residents' Association president would undertake efforts that mildly interfered with some trafficker activities in order to defuse the residents' resentment of traffickers. In Tubarao, Bernardo interceded on a number of occasions to prevent traffickers from using violence to resolve differences with residents and local leaders. In Vigirio, when traffickers had adequate connections, such as when the Casa da Paz collapsed, they manipulated politics in the favela without using violence. When they had inadequate contacts, such as when they tried to change the content of the election posters, they had to use threats to achieve their goal, and alienated residents. The restaurant owner who negotiated the agreement with the politician, a woman who had also brought in emergency relief supplies after a flood, left the favela within a year, causing it to lose an effective broker. By working through respected local leaders, traffickers use their position to minimise conflict with residents and provide services to increase resident support.
One could argue that since traffickers have a limited monopoly on violence, this obviates the role of social support and legitimacy within illegal networks. In the cases I have examined, ample evidence has demonstrated that when traffickers' use violence against leaders who oppose them they 99 Malkin, 'Narcotrafficking,' pp. 101o-3, o105-20; on traffickers, efforts to build legitimacy see Alvito, As cores de car, pp. 149-64.
The Dynamics of Criminal Governance 321 undermine local social ties.100 Clearly traffickers can violently force out other favela leaders. The issue for effective traffickers, though, is that they often do not want to do this since killing a respected leader would hurt their political position. As I noted earlier, when an unstable trafficker pushed community leaders out of Tubario in the 980s Bernardo brought in a new set of traffickers. In Vigario, when trafficker activities led to the murder of twenty-one residents, their support declined dramatically and they had to accept the development of organisations that reduced violence and drug sales. In this context it is not surprising that despite his differences with the President of Ceuzinho's Residents' Association that Bernardo prevented the traffickers from murdering the Ceuzinho president after he helped establish the police occupation. Criminal leaders benefit by working through established social networks and by using respected community leaders to defuse tensions with residents. As Alvito puts it in a slightly different context, compromising legitimate community leaders hurts traffickers by cutting off their ties to the media, civil society, and much of the state.1o1 This research has shown that if traffickers force local leaders out, they break up the networks that help produce some of the good will that protects them from the police. By actively working with respected leaders, drug traffickers appropriate existing social networks, work within the local norms, and accomplish difficult political aims with less violence than might otherwise be necessary. This does not mean that traffickers will not use violence to attempt to replace civic leaders who create difficulties for them. Indeed, over the years, hundreds of local leaders have been killed by traffickers for a number of reasons. What this evidence does suggest, however, is that traffickers need positive relations with civic leaders and that using violence against civic leaders comes at a certain cost. Traffickers use networks to build legitimacy because they sit on the frontier between state and society. On the one hand, they have a limited monopoly on the means of violence in favelas.102 On the other hand, they do not have at their disposal a large legitimacy-building apparatus and they face a state that, in part, builds its legitimacy by opposing their activities. As a result, traffickers must work through localised networks of trust and reciprocity to build the support necessary to prevent residents of favelas from allying themselves with other traffickers or the state. While traffickers are not just other members of a poor community helping out a comrade or a traditional patron the more deeply they work within and respect existing norms 100 See also Leeds, 'Cocaine and Parallel Polities,' pp. 70-3; Mafra, 'Drogas e simbolos,' pp. 281-2.
3 22 Ennrique DesmondArias and relationships the more likely it is that they will receive the residents' protection.
The last element of illegal networks is the police. Evidence from all three communities suggests the collusion of Rio de Janeiro's Policia Militar in drug trafficking at the favela level. However, corruption operated differently in the three communities. In Tubarlo and Santa Ana extortion schemes were managed at a very low level and the relationship between traffickers and police depended on particular shifts of police. In Vigirio, however, corruption seemed to be managed at a higher level within the battalion responsible for the area. All of this had different outcomes for the operation of the illegal network in the three favelas.l03
This analysis reveals that traffickers are well connected to state and social actors and that their political projects go beyond clientelism, linking them into legitimate, rule abiding state bureaucrats, NGOs, and religious organisations. They help traffickers make use of money made by legitimate businesses and build and reinforce their legitimacy in favelas.104 This article has shown that connections to local leaders help traffickers deliver services to residents and minimise conflicts. Through these networks, traffickers manage difficult negotiations with police. The result is that, more than filling in space left by the government, illegal networks appropriate existing state and societal resources and power and use them to establish protected spaces in which traffickers can engage in illegal activities. More than parallel 'states' or 'polities' drug trafficking in Rio represents an expression of transformed state and social power at the local level.
The spectrum inside 'Brown' areas: favelas and democragcy in Latin America Three factors drive the forms of violence facing Rio. First, the particular structural conditions that exist in Rio, a major port and tourist centre, contributed to the emergence of the city's role in drug transhipment and retailing. This gave rise to particular types of criminal enterprises focused on moving drugs through the city's favelas. Second, the structure of the state in Brazil in the post-democratisation period contributed to the way these new criminal organisations were able to operate. A large, complex and divided institution, the Brazilian state did not provide significant amounts of training or aid to a police force steeped in repressive violence during the dictatorship. Moreover, politicians campaigning for office in a state that no longer had the resources for large scale developmental or social programmes had to find 103 It should be noted that while only the Polida Militar (Rio's uniformed police) are discussed here, there is also ample corruption within the Polida Civil (Rio's investigative police). There were, however, few observations of their activities in these communities during field research. 104 Also see Alvito, As cores deAcari, pp. 1 5 I-3.
